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Permitted Austria to Be Free:
A Long-Standing Mystery Solved
On May 15, 1955 the Governments of France, the Soviet Union, the United
Kingdom and the United States, after long years of negotiations, signed with
Austria the treaty ending the four zone occupation of that country which had
begun ten years before. This agreement was not a "peace" treaty in the usual
sense, inasmuch as the United States was never at war with Austria, but was
titled appropriately the Austrian "State Treaty" because it restored Austria's
position of an independent sovereign State, as it had been before the forcible
take-over by Hitler and the anschluss which the United States never recog-
nized.
The constitutional groundwork for an independent Austria was, of course,
laid down initially by the Moscow Declaration of 1943, wherein it was pledged
that Austria should be made free and independent:
The Governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States
are agreed that Austria ... shall be liberated from German domination....
They regard the annexation imposed upon Austria by Germany on March 15, 1938
as null and void.... They declare that they wish to see re-established a free and in-
dependent Austria, and thereby open the way for the Austrian people themselves ...
to find that political and economic security which is the only basis for lasting peace.
Despite the injunction in this declaration, the history of the Austrian Treaty
negotiations is a frustrating illustration of classic Soviet obstructionism. First,
the USSR stalled on including the treaty on the agenda of the Foreign
Ministers meeting. All kinds of delaying tactics were then pursued by the
Soviet representatives whose demands required 379 meetings of the special
treaty commission, deputy foreign ministers and the Council of Ministers itself
in order to clarify the USSR's position. Agreement would appear to be
reached, only to be succeeded by more shifts in position by the Soviet Union.
Even a 48-to-O resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in
1952 (with the abstention of the Soviet bloc) which urged the four powers to
terminate their occupancy, failed to break the stalemate. At one point, in
February 1954 when the Austrian Government and the three Western Powers
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went so far as offering to accept the Soviet versions of the only five articles
that remained unagreed to in the draft treaty, the Soviet Foreign Minister
raised a wholly new and unacceptable demand that the Soviet military occupa-
tion should continue indefinitely-a condition which would have emasculated
the treaty.
All during this period the Soviet Government was draining Austria of vir-
tually every substantial asset it could lay its hands on. Under the pretext of the
Potsdam Agreement of August 1945, which permitted reparations for the
Allied and Associated Powers from "appropriate German external assets" the
Soviets applied this provision by force and duress even to properties seized by
Germany after the anschluss, to properties owned by the Government of
Austria and to property in Austria owned by nationals of other nations. Fac-
tories were dismantled and shipped to the Soviet Union. Over 63,000 pieces of
equipment were seized during the first year of postwar occupation. In ten
years, more than $500 million worth of oil was taken away by the USSR, along
with over $1 billion in property.' While all this looting was going on, the other
allied powers were providing assistance to Austria, to enable it to hold off the
economic disintegration during being engineered by the Soviet Union. The
United States alone gave Austria some $1.25 billion during the ten years of the
Soviet occupation, which put our Government, when one compares the
amounts involved, in the ridiculous and irritating posture of subsidizing the
Soviet Union for a large portion of its pilferages.
In addition, Article 21 of the Treaty of Peace with Rumania and Article 22
of the Peace Treaty with Hungary provided for withdrawal of allied forces
from the two countries within ninety days, subject to the right of the Soviet
Union to maintain troops in both on the lines of communication with its occu-
pation forces in Austria. Consummation of the Austrian treaty necessarily
would have the effect of annulling the peace treaty basis for the USSR to retain
its troops in the two satellite countries for the purpose of protecting its lines of
communication to Austria. Nevertheless, in view of previous violations by the
Soviets of provisions of the Hungarian and Rumanian treaties, the United
States Government was not too sanguine that the legalistics of the situation
would induce a Soviet military withdrawal from those two countries.
So much by way of the amalgam of components which may have condi-
tioned Soviet intransigence on the Austrian treaty. When all these factors are
taken into consideration, there seemed small likelihood that the USSR would
soon relax its noose around Austria's neck, not only for its material advan-
tages, but also for its transparent political design. Then, suddenly, in 1955,
'The Austrian State Treaty. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States
Senate, June 10, 1955, on Executive G, 84th Cong. 1st Sess., p. 6.
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Soviet policy underwent a dramatic change. Whether it was a coincidence or
not the reversal took place when parliamentary action by the Western European
Governments assured completion of the Paris Accords which restored sove-
reignty to the Federal Republic of Germany, creating the Western European
Union, and providing for membership of the Federal Republic of Germany in
NATO. In any event, on March 25 of that year, the Austrian Chancellor
(Raab) was invited to Moscow to discuss areas of disagreement between the
parties. Seven weeks later, on May 15, the four occupation powers and Austria
signed the treaty. The Soviets withdrew or compromised every obstacle which
they had erected to the treaty in the prior years of negotiation. Why? What
was the reason for this about-face? For years, that nagging question persisted,
with no satisfactory answer.
When the treaty was presented to the United States Senate for its advice and
consent a like bewilderment was manifested that the USSR had finally agreed
to give up its occupation of Austria. For, neither before nor since has the
Soviet Union relinquished control over any territory it had seized, at least not
without installing a regime of its own selection or persuasion. To most
observers it was incredible that they should have done so with Austria, and to
have permitted the people of that nation to choose, in free elections, the Gov-
ernment they desired. Surely, Western action on the Paris Accords does not
adequately explain the enigma. Nor was Secretary of State Dulles' report to
the President able to offer a more enlightening answer:
The cause of this change of policy on the part of the Soviet Government can only
be conjectured. Certainly it is not without significance that the change coincided with
assurance that the Paris Pacts would be ratified, Western Europe consolidated and a
free and independent Federal Republic of Germany brought into NATO.2
Although "not without significance," agreement on the Paris Pacts is hardly
the real solution; there had to be more to it than that, and there was. The pres-
ent Editor-in-Chief of the International Lawyer tripped on it quite by accident
during a luncheon at the Austrian Embassy in London over a year ago. It was
then he learned that Soviet withdrawal was unquestionably attributable to the
resourcefulness of the American military officer who was the legal adviser in
1946 to the United States High Commissioner in Austria, General Mark Clark.
That legal adviser was Colonel Eberhard P. Deutsch, of New Orleans, the
former Editor-in-Chief of the International Lawyer. The technique which he
cooked up to resolve the difficult constitutional dilemma which the Soviet
presence had created was the device of the "reverse veto."
As subsequently disclosed to Mr. Freeman in London, and later confirmed
'The Austrian State Treaty. Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States
Senate, on Executive G, 84th Cong. 1st Sess., June 15, 1955, p. 4.
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and amplified by Colonel Deutsch, the situation at the time was as follows:
During the occupation period, laws passed by the Austrian Parliament could
not be enacted or applied without the agreement of all of the Four-Power oc-
cupation authorities-the principle of unanimity. Although, as might be im-
agined, Austrian bills were normally agreed to by the Western Powers, very
often, and usually in the most important cases, the Soviet veto would block
many bills essential to the reconstruction of the young Austrian Republic.
Each of the military governments was divided into committees, chaired each
month by a different government. At the time of the incidents described, Col-
onel Deutsch, as Chief of the United States Legal Committee, was the chair-
man of the Allied Legal Committee. For various reasons it was agreed in 1946
that the International Control Agreement on which the military government of
Austria was based, needed to be changed. By that time, the Austrian Govern-
ment, which had been functioning under decrees of a cabinet, had established
an elected parliament. None of the reasons for a change in the military regime
was of any particular importance to the USSR, because all they really wanted
was recbgnition of their right to be in Austria. As already mentioned, this was
indispensable to the retention of their occupying forces in Yugoslavia, Hun-
gary and Rumania. When a decree or law was enacted, it would come before
the joint Allied Legal Committee for analysis and report. If reported favoi-
ably, and accepted unanimously by the Allied Council-which was, of course,
composed of chiefs of the occupying forces, then, and only then, could the law
or decree become effective. It was about this time that it occurred to Colonel
Deutsch that if this stalemating procedure could be replaced it would be most
satisfactory for the future progress of Austria, which was favorably disposed
to the recommendations of the Western Powers.
Accordingly, Deutsch suggested that the Austrians should proceed to enact
their laws through the Parliament, and if they were not unanimously disap-
proved by the Allied Council within thirty-one days they would become law. In
this way, Deutsch explained to the Russians, the idea of "unanimity" would
be preserved. The suggestion was then adopted in the revised International
Control Agreement for the Government of Austria. Thereafter, when the
Austrians wished to enact a law, it was first discussed with the American con-
tingent. After passage, it could not be killed by a Soviet veto, since disapproval
required unanimous action. The result was that while the principle of unani-
mity so important to the Russian military was maintained, the Western Powers
had complete control of Austrian legislation. Clearly, the Russians simply did
not know what they were getting into. A concomitant of this was that when the
elections were held for Parliament, General Mark Clark, as High Commis-
sioner in the Military Government, managed to see that they were conducted
along "good old American lines." This was accomplished by having teams
composed of four officers of each of the occupying forces as "poll watchers"
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both in the Western and Eastern occupied zones. As a consequence, of the 165
members of Parliament elected, only three were members of the Communist
Party.
It soon became obvious that the jig was up, even though it took the Soviets
some eight years to throw in the towel on what had become for them a wholly
futile participation in the Allied Council. The Austrian State Treaty and Soviet
departure from the occupation followed.
The unique role of Colonel Deutsch in virtually single-handedly inducing the
Soviet disengagement was recognized by the Austrian Ambassador to the
United States, Dr. Ernst Lemberger on March 2, 1967. Conferring upon Col-
onel Deutsch the Gold Badge of Merit awarded to him by the President of
Austria, Ambassador Lemberger declared:
The entire reconstruction of our law system and the whole legal basis of Austria's
economic reconstruction after the war was possible only by the above-mentioned
agreement, and so Colonel Deutsch really laid the foundation stone for the recon-
struction of Austria.
The episode never received the attention it deserved, although the achieve-
ment had been noted in the local press over ten years before. In its issue of
December 21, 1955, the Times Picayune had this to say:
... the negative veto ... was probably the shrewdest piece of diplomatic razzle-
dazzle perpetrated on the Russians to date in any theatre ...
How the Soviets ever were bamboozled into accepting that clause remains one of
the great mysteries of international diplomacy. And the presumption that the Musco-
vites goofed is heightened by the fact that the head of the Russian element of the
Secretariat shortly afterwards went home "on leave" and never came back.
While other factors may also have entered into the Soviet decision to with-
draw from Austria, there is little question but that Colonel Deutsch's contribu-
tion created the conditions which convinced the Russians that further continu-
ance of the occupation could not advance their goal of a Communist take-
over.
The lesson to be drawn from this fascinating incident should be apparent. In
diplomacy, as in private practice, there is no substitute for the trained lawyer's
skills and resourcefulness. In a potentially critical situation for the future free-
dom of a great people, those skills paid off. Unfortunately, the United States
has not always enjoyed this calibre of ingenuity from its negotiating teams-
two distressing examples being the Potsdam Agreement on Berlin, for which
this nation has already paid dearly; and the Panama Canal Treaties of 1977,
which could have been made more palatable to the American people by more
solid draftsmanship and a more acute sensitivity to what is required by the na-
tional interest.
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